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Abstract: Portfolio theory and the basic ideas of Markowitz have been extended in the re-
cent past by alternative risk models as historical simulation or even copula functions. The 
central question of this paper is if these approaches lead to different results compared to 
the classical variance/covariance approach. Therefore, empirical data of the last 10 years 
is analysed. Both approaches are compared in the special context of the financial crisis. 
The worst case optimization and the Value at Risk (VaR) are defined in order to define the 
minimum risk portfolio before and after the financial crisis. The result is that the financial 
crisis has nearly no impact onto the portfolio, but the two approaches lead to different 
results. 
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1  Introduction and Aim of the Paper 
Portfolio theory has been in existence for more than 50 years. But the financial crisis in 
2008 led to the discussion of the fact that the extreme movements of diversified portfolios 
had not been forecasted. It is often said that this model failure led to high losses in 2008 
that might have been prevented if a model that integrates worst cases scenarios would 
have been used. Alternative but more complex methods should have been used.  
Portfolio theory in extreme market situations is therefore a topic that has to be discussed. 
Therefore, the historical simulation and the classical variance/covariance approach are 
analyzed. The central question to be answered by this paper is: 
Does portfolio optimization by means of historical simulation in the times of financial 
crisis  lead  to  other  results  than  the  classical  variance/covariance  approach?  Do  the 
results change if a high confidential level or the worst case is chosen? 
The assumption lying behind this is that extreme developments of portfolios cannot be 
quantified by means of a normal distribution in the variance/covariance approach. This 
has to be proven. Financial Assets and Investing 
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The  structure  is  as  follows.  After  the  introduction,  section  2  discusses  the  theoretical 
basics according to portfolio theory. The relevant theories of portfolio management, asset 
allocation and risk/return are presented and discussed in the context of portfolio theory in 
a worst case scenario. The main aim is to define the used optimizing criteria for section 3. 
Section 3 describes the simulation and the parameters. Section 4 deals with the different 
results  of  the  variance/covariance  approach  and  the  historical  simulation.  Therefore, 
several simulations based on historical data are done. Section 5 sums up the main results, 
discusses them critically and answers the critical question of this paper looking at all 
aspects. 
2  Theoretical Aspects of Portfolio Theory 
2.1  Definition of Risk and VaR 
Whenever the discussion about portfolio diversification and risk minimization occurs, the 
first step is to define risk. In general, risk is the positive or negative unexpected difference 
from an expected value (Woll, 1996, p. 605). The positive difference is called chance, so 
only the negative difference from the expected value remains (Rolfes, 1999, p. 29; Reuse, 
2006, p. 366; Reuse 2008, p. 5). This leads to the result that expected changes from the 
actual value of an asset are not defined as risk. They can be calculated ex ante and can be 
priced into the asset. An example is the so called spread in the corporate bond market. It is 
defined as the difference between the yield of the bond and the maturity equivalent risk 
free  rate,  for  example  US  treasuries  or  German  treasury  bonds.  The  spread  becomes 
higher, if the credit risks in the corporate bond increases. 
One of methods to measure risk is the VaR (Value at Risk). It can be defined as the 
unexpected loss that will not be exceeded within a certain time under the assumption of a 
defined security level, called confidential level (e.g. Schierenbeck, 2001, p. 17; Reuse, 
2006, p. 366). This definition leads to several factors that influence the VaR. In general, it 
can be stated that the VaR will increase, if the disposition period becomes longer and the 
confidential level gets higher (Reuse, 2006, p. 366). The model used to measure the risk 
influences the VaR as well, but this depends on the risk category and not on the basic 
assumptions to measure risk (Rolfes, 1999, p. 120).
In this article, three risk measurement variables will be used: the variance (z = 84.13), the 
VaR (z = e.g. 99.00) and the worst case (z = 100.00) that is defined as the highest loss 
than could have been stated in the historical development of an asset. 
2.2  Portfolio Selection 
The origin of Portfolio Theory can be found in 1952. Harry M. Markowitz published his 
theory in an article in the “Journal of Finance” titled “Portfolio Selection” (Markowitz, 
1952, p. 77; Markowitz, 1987, p. 3). Markowitz demonstrates how an investor can reduce No. 1/2010 
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the risk, or the standard deviation of the portfolio returns by choosing stocks that do not 
move exactly together (Discussed in Linnertová & Reuse, 2008, pp. 554–556).  
The portfolio theory analyses the situation of investment decisions considering risk using 
the principle of ￿ ￿: The volatility can be seen as a degree of risk if all shares can be 
described by the expected returns (￿) and the volatility (￿) of returns. The theory assumes 
risk-averse behaviour of investors, which means that they are willing to renounce with 
return in favour of reducing the risk of an investment. A portfolio is consequently risk 
efficient if there is no alternative to get less ￿ for the same ￿, more ￿ for the same ￿ or 
both more ￿ and less ￿. 
The  expected  rate  of  return  resulting  from  diversification  corresponds  to  the  sum  of 
returns of particular shares weighted by their proportion within the portfolio. Therefore, 
the expected rate of return of a portfolio ￿p consisting of n shares i with expected returns 
￿i is: 
￿
=
=
n
i
i i p x
1
µ µ      with     ￿
=
=
n
i
i x
1
1    (1) 
where: 
￿p  =  expected return of portfolio 
￿i  =  expected return of share i 
n  =  number of available shares 
xi  =  proportion of share i within the portfolio 
The standard deviation of the portfolio diversification is not equivalent to the weighted 
sum of every single variance. Additionally, the stochastic dependence of particular shares 
measured by the covariance covij has to be taken into account. The basic idea lying behind 
this is that a diversified risk is always smaller than the weighted sum of the risks if the 
correlations between the assets are smaller than one. Markowitz argues with covariances 
and variances of portfolios instead of correlation effects but can be cited as follows: “If 
two original Portfolios have equal variance then typically the variance of the resulting 
(compound)  portfolio  will  be  less  than  the  variance  of  either  original  portfolios” 
(Markowitz,  1952,  pp.  89–90). The  formula  can  be  written  as  follows  (Schierenbeck, 
2001, pp. 78–79), whereas the standard deviation is multiplied with a certain z-factor in 
order to achieve the relevant VaR for the portfolio risk (Hager, n.Y., p. 3). 
z x x VaR
n
i
n
j
ij j i j i P ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = ￿￿
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ρ σ σ (2) Financial Assets and Investing 
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where: 
VaRp  =  Value at Risk of the portfolio 
xi  =  part of asset i 
xj  =  part of asset j 
σi  =  standard deviation of asset i 
σj  =  standard deviation of asset j 
￿i,j  =  correlation coefficient between the assets i and j 
n  =  number of assets 
z  =  z factor of the normal distribution (2.326 for 99%, 1.645 for 95%,    
    1.000 for 84.13%) 
ki,j  = 
j i
j i
σ σ ⋅
, cov
This approach will be defined as a variance/covariance or up to now classical Markowitz 
approach as it defines the basic idea how to optimize a portfolio – including all advantages 
and disadvantages of the assumption of a normal distribution (Reuse 2006, p. 367). 
2.3  Historical Simulation – Extending the Variance/Covariance Approach 
If historical data is used to define diversification, the historical simulation can be used as 
well. While the variance/covariance approach shows the inherent assumption of a standard 
normal distribution (Bühler/Korn/Schmidt, 1998, p. 67), the historical simulation goes one 
step  further.  It  uses  a  “real”  distribution  without  converting  historical  data  into  a 
distribution function. It defines risk as the difference from an expected value. A further 
advantage is that extreme changes in the history that exist above the chosen confidential 
level can be measured as well as they are not converted into a distribution function. The 
historical simulation can be modelled as follows: 
[ ] ) ( % i s a P r Quartile r VaR − = (4) 
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ =
−1
ln
i
i
i V
V r (5) No. 1/2010 
19 
where: 
VaRp  =  Value at Risk of the portfolio 
ri  =  all historical yields (e.g. 1 / 10 / 250 days) of the used historical data 
ra  =  average of all historical yields (e.g. 1 / 10 / 250 days) of the used historical data 
s  =  security level (e.g. 100%, 99%, 95%, 84.13%) for defining the z value of the  
    normal distribution 
Vi  =  value of portfolio at ti 
The real distribution differs from the normal distribution function. This is shown in figure 
1 that represents the lognormal daily changes in a “real” distribution compared with a 
transformation into a standard distribution of the German DAX (Deutscher Aktienindex). 
Figure 1 shows that a standard normal distribution is only an approximation of the “real” 
distribution. The yields show extreme movements in other barriers than expected. So it 
would be the best to use the historical yields to measure risk. In addition, the procedure is 
less analytical than the variance/covariance approach but the amount of the needed data is 
much higher (A critical analysis of several VaR methods can be found in Goebel & Sievi 
& Schumacher, 1999, p. 236, discussed in Reuse 2006, p. 367). 
Fig. 1 DAX yields – real and transformed distribution 
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Source:  VWD,  yearly  returns,  mean  =  2.022%,  standard  deviation  =  23.283%  p.a.  Data: 
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It works as follows (Bühler/Korn/Schmidt 1998, p. 68): the historical price developments 
are transformed into lognormal yields (see equation 5). Yields of a specific history for all 
assets build a yield set. All yield sets that are evaluated in this way – typically several 
thousands – are added to the existing portfolio. Thousands of virtual portfolio changes can 
be defined. They are sorted by height and the needed quartile is defined by counting these 
changes. In the case of 100 possible portfolio changes and 99% confidential level, the 
second worst value is the VaR that will not be exceeded within the defined period. The 
worst case scenario would be defined as the worst simulated yield in order to get the most 
extreme historical movements of the past. 
Applying this on a portfolio leads to the conclusion that this procedure must be done for 
all  asset  combinations  for  the  given  historical  yields.  The  advantage  is  that  extreme 
movements can be analyzed specifically and that only changes that appeared in the past 
are interpolated into the future. 
3  Modelling the Simulation on the Basis of Historical Data 
3.1  Asset Classes and Data used 
There are many assets, but the most interesting ones are the five assets that are presented 
in figure 2.  
Fig. 2 Used asset classes 
Asset Class  Description  Reason  why  the  asset  class  is 
used 
RexP 
(Rentenindex 
Performance
index) 
This index represents the German 
covered  bond  market  and  is  the 
main  asset  class  a  risk  averse 
investor  can  invest  in.  For  the 
asset  class  “yields”,  it  is  a 
representative  index  as  every 
maturity is implemented. 
Bonds  are  the  basic investments 
an investor has. This asset class 
has to be diversified. 
DAX  Represents the biggest 30 shares 
in  the  German  market  and  is  a 
typical  synonym  for  the  asset 
class “shares”. 
Correlations  between  shares  and 
bonds are the oldest histories that 
can  be  analyzed.  A  diversified 
portfolio  without  shares  would 
not embrace all aspects. No. 1/2010 
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Deka  Real 
Estate 
Europa 
Estates and the investment in this 
asset  class  are  becoming  more 
popular.  The  presented 
investment  fund  is  one  of  the 
biggest in the German market and 
most  diversified  in  Europe.  It 
may be taken as a synonym for 
the asset class “estates”. 
The  correlation  between  estates 
and all other asset classes is said 
to be about 0. This is the reason 
why it is used in this analysis. 
Money 
Market 3M 
This  index  consists  of  the  3M 
Euribor  rate  and  transforms  the 
yields into a performance. It is a 
synonym for “risk free yield”. 
As  risk  is  defined  as  the 
difference  to  the  expected  or 
secure  value,  a  risk  free  rate  in 
order to define the zero risk point 
has to be used in the analysis as 
well. 
Dow  Jones 
AIG 
This rollover index consists of 19 
physical  commodities  traded  on 
the  U.S.  Exchange  with  the 
exception  of  aluminium,  nickel, 
zinc  which  is  traded  on  the 
London Metal Exchange. It may 
be  taken  as  a  synonym  for  the 
asset class “commodities”. 
Commodities  are  often  used  to 
diversify  a  portfolio  as  the 
correlations  are  near  0  or 
negative. 
Source: author’s own figure
Data is available from 12/31/1998 up to 11/28/2008 on a daily basis (Source: Datastream 
2008 and VWD 2008). A 10 year history shall be enough to use reliable data for the 
calculation. Further, the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008 and the subprime crisis 
can be found in the historical data.  
3.2  Parameters of the Simulations 
It shall be found out whether the optimization on the basis of the historical simulation 
leads  to  other  results  than  the  classical  Markowitz  approach.  Therefore,  several 
simulations shall be done. As only a free portfolio optimization can prove the central 
assumption of this assignment, no volume restrictions are entered. But all other parameters 
can be changed. Therefore, the following sets are calculated (Fig. 3). Financial Assets and Investing 
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Fig. 3 Used parameter sets 
Parameter  Choice  Reason why these parameters are used 
Disposition 
horizon 
1-day-yield 
10-day-yield 
250-day-yield 
These  parameters  are  the  typically  used 
disposition  horizons  in  practice.  The 
overnight risk and the 10 day (two weeks) 
risk  period  are  useful  especially  for 
measuring trading book risk (Schierenbeck, 
2001,  pp.  358,  447).  The  250-day-yield 
reflects  one  year,  which  is  the  classical 
period in the Markowitz approach. A longer 
period does not make sense as the maximal 
used period for measuring market price risk 
is one year. 
History  12/31/1998–12/31/2007 
12/31/1998–11/28/2008 
The  DAX  reached  its  high  at  the  end  of 
2007. An interesting question is whether a 
worst  case  optimization  on  the  basis  of 
2007 would have led to other results. 
Confidential 
Level 
99.00% 
84.13% 
100.00% (Worst Case in 
history) 
The  difference  between  the  classical 
standard  deviation  and  the  VaR  shall  be 
analyzed critically. Further, the worst case 
is analyzed as well. 
Source: author’s own figure
The confidential level that has to be defined leads to the definition of risk. In the classical 
variance/covariance  approach  the  standard  deviation  is  used  to  quantify  risk.  In  this 
simulation, the confidential level of 99% is chosen. This leads to a different z-factor in the 
variance/covariance  approach  when  defining  risk  –  and  to  another  risk  level  in  the 
nonnormal distributed historical simulation. This is the first way to define risk in extreme 
situations – even though the 99% confidential level might not be enough.  
As a consequence, there are 12 scenarios that have to be calculated. As the used histories 
and time horizons change, expected yields and correlations change as well for the 12 
scenarios. The results are distinguished into those before and into those after the financial 
crisis in 2008. Therefore, there are two data periods that lead to 24 scenarios in the end. 
3.3  Optimization Problem – Minimizing Risk 
This analysis focuses on the risk minimizing portfolios calculated by several confidential 
levels in the historical simulation and the variance/covariance approach. In order to solve 
the central questions of this work, an Excel based tool is created that is able to simulate 
portfolio  optimization  under  different circumstances.  The  classical  variance/covariance 
approach as well as the described historical simulation are implemented, including an No. 1/2010 
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optimization on the basis of the worst case scenario (confidential level 100%). Therefore, 
the mathematical framework of section 2.1–2.3 is used.  
For  both  approaches  (variance/covariance  and  historical  simulation),  an  optimization 
problem has to be solved. This is done by means of the SOLVER in MS Excel, consisting 
of the following framework: 
• Iterations: 100 
• Exactness: 0.000001 
• Tolerance: 5% 
• Convergence: 0.0001 
• Linear optimization of the Newton approach 
For the variance/covariance approach and the historical simulation, the combination with 
the  lowest  risk  is  chosen  in  this  setup  in  order  to  define  the  minimum  risk  portfolio 
resulting from historical data. Consequently, two minimum risk portfolios for each of the 
12 scenarios have to be modelled. These problems can be set up as follows (e.g. Perridon 
& Steiner, 2007, p. 244): 
Variance /covariance approach 
z x x Min
n
i
n
j
ij j i j i ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ￿￿
= = 1 1
! ρ σ σ (6) 
with: ￿
=
=
n
i
i x
1
1;  1 0 ≤ ≤ i x ;  ￿
=
=
n
i
i i p x
1
µ µ
Historical simulation 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
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⋅ − ￿
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=
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ln
i
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i V
V rFinancial Assets and Investing 
24 
4  Results of the Simulations 
4.1  Analyzing the Minimum Risk Portfolios 
The results are summed up in figure 4. The first result is that the different history – before 
and after the financial crisis – does not lead to a different portfolio optimum in both 
models. The risk minimized portfolios show nearly the same percentages. Further, the 
assumption that the worst case leads to significant different results must be rejected as 
well. If the historical simulation is calculated at a high confidential level, the worst case 
portfolio combination does not differ too much from e.g. a 99% confidential level result. 
Comparing the three historical simulations, it is interesting to see that the combination on 
the basis of the standard deviation leads to different results compared to the worst case 
and the 99% confidential level setup. The result is that especially in the case of market 
price risks a historical simulation has to be done at a high confidential level in order to 
measure the risk in an adequate way. Low confidential levels underestimate risk and shall 
be omitted. No. 1/2010 
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Fig. 4 Results of the simulations 
Source: author’s own figure
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Normally, portfolio optimization is done to create a strategic position. Nevertheless, the 
investor often faces the situation that the portfolio loses very much in a short time even 
though  the  long  term  risk  is  lower.  Therefore,  the  three  different  time  horizons  were 
chosen. The results differ both in the variance/covariance approach and in the historical 
simulation. While the first approach always achieves more than 98% of money market in 
the 1 day and 10 day scenario, the historical simulation only leads to about 80% money 
market. At least a small part (5–15%) shall be invested in real estates. When calculating a 
250 day scenario, both variance/covariance approach and historical simulation lead to a 
smaller part of money market – but the difference in the approaches can be seen most 
clearly in the 250 day setup. While the variance/covariance approach offers about 80% of 
money market and 15% of RexP, the historical simulation only invests 35% in money 
markets but about 30% in real estates, 20% in RexP and about 5–10% in Dow Jones AIG 
and DAX. 
This difference in the models has to be explained. First, the historical simulation defines 
risk  as  a  difference  from  the expected  or  calculated  yield. The  longer the  disposition 
horizon, the higher is the different definition of risk. But the second argument is more 
important:  the  standard  normal  distribution  cannot  be  assumed  especially  in  extreme 
situations of a market movement. So the diversification effect between real estates and 
money market that is quantified with the correlation of 0.8639 in the variance/covariance 
approach is much higher when choosing the historical simulation approach. 
4.2  Analyzing all Combinations of One Scenario 
Besides  the  optimization  presented  above,  the  tool  is  able  to  optimize  a  portfolio 
consisting of 5 assets in 10% steps of a portfolio mixture. So the part of every asset class 
is between 0 and 100% that makes 11 possible characteristics. This leads to 1,001 possible 
portfolio combinations.  
The  results  are  visualized  in  figure  5  that  compares  the  optimization  of 
variance/covariance approach and historical simulation for 99% confidential level, 250-
day-yield, 12/31/1998–11/28/2008. No. 1/2010 
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Fig. 5 Minimum risk portfolio by both approaches 
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Source: author’s own figure.  99% confidential level, 250-day-yield, 12/31/1998–11/28/2008 
The  variance/covariance  approach  offers  several  portfolio  combinations  that  did  not 
appear  in  the  chosen  history.  This  model  risk  results  from  the  transformation  into  a 
standard  normal  distribution.  The  real  distribution  differs  completely  from  the 
standardized  one.  The  portfolio  combinations  shown  in  the  middle  of  the 
variance/covariance  approach  have  a  lower  risk  in  the  historical  simulation  approach. 
Further,  it  can  be  stated  that  the  extreme  values  cannot  be  seen  as  often  as  in  the Financial Assets and Investing 
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variance/covariance  approach.  The  result  is  a  different  minimum  risk  portfolio 
combination  in  the  historical  simulation.  The  combination  suggested  by 
variance/covariance  would  have  the  risk  of  1.55%,  while  the  one  of  the  historical 
simulation only has 0.28%. A similar result can be stated if the analysis is done with 
expected yields. This might be necessary as the DAX yield is too low compared to its 
long-term history. The yield should be at least about 8–10%. Even though there are many 
portfolio combinations which have nearly the same risk, the historical simulation is better 
at optimizing a portfolio. 
5. Conclusion 
Both variance/covariance approach and historical simulation have been analyzed in this 
article. The results can be summed up as follows:  
(1) There is nearly no difference in the portfolio mixes including and excluding the 
year 2008. The financial crisis has nearly no impacts on the portfolio optimization. 
(2) An optimization on the basis of the worst case (100% confidential level) does not 
lead to other results, if the confidential level of the chosen simulation is set high 
enough, e.g. 99%. 
(3) The disposition horizons (1, 10, 250 days) lead to completely different results in 
both approaches. 
(4) The variance/covariance approach and the historical simulation lead to different 
results. These differences increase with the disposition horizon. Two arguments 
can be given therefore: first, risk is defined as the difference from the expected 
yield in the historical simulation while variance/covariance defines risk as the 
difference  from  the  actual  value.  Second,  the  transformation  into  a  standard 
normal distribution does not reflect the real historical movements of the data. 
(5) Therefore, several risk/return combinations offered by variance/covariance do not 
exist in the historical simulation. The risk and return that were evaluated by the 
historical simulation are lower than in the variance/covariance approach. 
(6) The  historical  simulation  leads  to  a  better  portfolio  mix.  The  combination 
suggested by variance/covariance leads to a higher risk. 
(7) The diversification effects of real estates and commodities are quantified better in 
the  historical  simulation  as  both  assets  get  nearly  no  percentage  in  the 
variance/covariance approach. 
As a result, the answer to the central question of this assignment whether the historical 
simulation leads to other results than the variance/covariance approach can be seen as 
affirmative. The results differ. On the other hand, an optimization according to the worst 
case scenario does not lead to other results if the confidential level is set high enough. 
Both approaches are used in practice and lead to reliable results. The final result of this 
article is that the historical simulation is better than the variance/covariance approach. But No. 1/2010 
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both approaches have to be seen critically, as they are based on historical data. The choice 
of the history influences especially the yield to a high degree. In the used history, the 
DAX has a historical 1 year yield of about 2%. This is too low compared to its long term 
history. But the choice of the “right” horizon remains difficult. 
Further, it has to be stated that both approaches led to optimized portfolios that were not 
able  to  survive  the  financial  crisis  in  2007/2008.  Alternative  assets  as  ABS  and 
commodities were used to realize correlation effects that disappeared in the crisis. The 
failure of the models has numerous reasons. First, a simple historical market price analysis 
was done in order to define correlations – assuming that an index reflects the development 
of a complete asset class. Second, alternative asset classes only have a short term history. 
E.g. ABS indices do not exist for a very long time. Third, nearly no investor looked into 
the structure of the ABS investments. A simple market price analysis is not enough, if the 
assets are very complex in their modulation. The model risk in these asset classes is at 
least  as  high  as  the  market  price  risk  as  the  development  of  2007/2008  has  shown 
(Frère/Reuse/Svoboda, 2008, p. 16). Fourth, the classical variance/covariance approach 
leads to other portfolios than the historical simulation. Without knowing the reasons why 
this takes place or under which circumstances which model offers which combination, an 
investor uses a tool without understanding how it works.  
The main lesson to be learned from the financial crisis is that models should be simple 
enough to be understood by the user – as variance/covariance or historical simulation. 
Even though more complex approaches as copulas (discussed e.g. Beck & Lesko, 2006; 
Beck & Lesko & Schlottmann & Wimmer, 2006; Lesko, 2006; Mashal & Zeevi, 2002) 
may lead to results that fulfil statistical requirements better, the collateral damage of using 
methods that are not completely understood is higher than the model inexactness. 
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